Creating Citizen Soldiers

5-10-05

Creating Cit= izen Soldiers:

The Normaliz= ation of Violence in Corporate Entertainment

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The normaliz= ation of violence has become a useful tool for the recruiting efforts of The Unit= ed States military establishment. Through established networks within Hollywood, professional sports, and the= video game industry the military has successfully instituted recruiting campaigns while performing operations under patriotic and public intentions. These relationships help to foster= an institutional norm towards violence and assist in molding young impressionable minds. By desensitizing and normalizing violence, facets of society have conditioned its citizenry to become effect= ive killers both at home, and abroad. This essay will examine the normalization of violence as a controlli= ng process in our society and how the US military uses that process= in order to recruit a vulnerable mind. I will examine the incremental changes in military training to trans= form a citizen into a standardized killing machine and how our entertainment industry is taking on a similar role without offering the proper restraints= .

The recondit= ioning process is one used by the military in attempting to eliminate the percenta= ge of non-firing troops in combat. Within a civil society, the act of killing prior to Vietnam was considered an unn= atural action for a rational human to perform or witness without activating an internal warning. Dave Grossma= n, a former Army Ranger and paratrooper, reveals a transition in United States military training during the Vietnam Era which conditioned troops to kill at a rate never seen before. He = notes the American Civil War, when faced with an opponent as opposed to a target, many soldiers: “revert to a posturing mode in which they fire over th= eir enemies head” (11). After studyi= ng kill rates, researchers found that non-firing rates of riflemen in combat were 75-80 percent in WW II and in prior conflicts, whereas in Vietn= am the rate had gone down to 5 percent (250).= Grossman alludes to the modification of training that allowed firing rates and kill rates to significantly increase. The key was to eliminate personal responsibility involved with killing, dehumanize the enemy, and normalize v= iolence in the life of a soldier. Gwyne Dyer in War explains how violence in= boot camp becomes second-nature during the process of breaking down and rebuildi= ng a recruit:

Most of the language used in Parris Island to describe the joys of killing peopl= e is bloodthirsty but meaningless hyperbole, and the recruits realize that even = as they enjoy it. Nevertheless, = it does help to desensitize them to the suffering of an enemy, and at the same time they are being indoctrinated in the most explicit fashion (as previous generations were not) with the notions that their purpose is not just to be brave or to fight well; it is to kill people (Grossman 252). =

Dyer adds that recruits are typically of post-adolescent age and most vulnerable to the susceptibilities of indoctrination. Whereas the military has had all of history to perfect its techniques, recruits have had little time to realize they exist.

Citizens a= re generally turned off by violence if they know it is real. The Pentagon and media establishme= nt recognized the danger real viol= ence played in diffusing support for the Vietnam War. Kathleen Wilusz writes about the i= mpact images from Vietnam<= /st1:country-region> had on initiating popular protest to the war. Realizing their mistake, the gover= nment enacted a campaign to ensure that only “approved images” were s= ent to the American public during The Gulf War (Wilusz 178). Images showed more of a fireworks display as war was turned into evening entertainment. Blood and death were limited to th= e few statistics that were shown of US troops, no “official” statisti= cs existed for Iraqis. The war w= as given an “antiseptic” mood that appeared more like a video game. Bosah Ebo compare= s the war to the recreational violence we find in such games, saying it lacked the “traditional sense of remorse associated with such behaviors in real = life” (Wilusz 183). Like other viol= ent entertainment, Americans could easily choose to watch or not watch because = they never saw the war as “real”.

While viol= ence can mobilize individuals to protest a war as seen during Vietnam, it can also be used = by the establishment as a means of persuasion.&nb= sp; In times of crisis, civil society is willing to give up many of its freedoms in order to fight a common cause.

The dehumani= zation of the enemy is training not limited to elite military outfits or boot camp recruits, in fact, it is a process applied directly to the citizenry of America= through daily news and media coverage of the War on Terrorism. Like Orwell’s totalitarian w= orld of 1984, Big Brother demanded compliance to two minutes of daily hat= e towards the enemy. The citizens were acquiescent as non-compliance was not an option. Eventually, through a period of mas= sive brainwashing, the hate became internalized and self-perpetuated.

Post Septemb= er 11^th provides an example of the power mass media holds in prolonging antagonism = against an enemy and erecting an image that is the antithesis of human struggle. By giving the adversary the title “terrorist”, and leaving mute any rational inquiry as to the enemy’s purpose, it creates an environment= of confusion. The citizenry seeking answers quickly fall in line with the will= of Big Brother who provides certainty and safety within the setting of what Benedict Anderson would call an “imagined community”. They plead for more restrictions o= n their own lives to include the Patriot Act and airline screening in exchange for = the feeling of security. They beg= in to turn-in suspicious individuals to the FBI because of the color of their ski= n, or a rag wrapped around their head. In short, the Orwellian mindset all= ows a state to perform more egregious actions than a functioning democracy might otherwise allow. Mechanism of restraint such as the media failed to act in an objective manner as cable n= ews anchors flooded the background of their stories with the American flag. Harper’s Magazine publisher = John R. MacArthur criticized the media for, “acting as an arm of the government as opposed to an independent, objective purveyor of information” (http://www.imdb.com/news/sb/2001-09-20). Instead of questioning the hysteri= a, the media perpetuated it, and set their cameras towards war.

Abu Ghraib e= xists as a present day example of the effects that dehumanizing the enemy has. When one is able to see another as= less than human, acts of violence are easier to justify. Violent means of torture become legitimate acts of heroism in the eyes of citizens who see a noble cause on= the horizon. One need only watch = an episode of 24 on weekly primetime television to see how network executives and writers justify torture as if it will save the world. Suggesting that such a measure is justified questions the ethics our society deems to hold value in. When we claim torture to be a substantial means to an end for one situation it soon transforms the except= ion into policy. Thereafter the s= ubjection of the prisoner as less than human can always be justified by insinuating h= is connection to terrorism.

The Abu Ghra= ib example raises many questions as to how a disciplined military outfit could perpetrate such actions. My own military = experience compels me to believe that we have the most disciplined outfit in the world= in regards to following orders. W= hile modern soldiers are trained to successfully kill their enemies, they are al= so trained to do so under the most stringent rules. They must be able to understand wh= en deadly force can be applied and what garnishes the right to even un-holster their weapon, let alone fire it. This entails= that they not only follow orders, but employ restraints. John Stuart Mill wrote of the impo= rtance discipline holds in a multi-national state: “The sole bond which holds them together is their officers and the government which they serve; and th= eir only idea, if they have any, of public duty is obedience to orders” (Karras 472). Therefore, when orders compel one to disobey higher values such as the Geneva Conventions, = a soldier’s principles are put in jeopardy.

The release = of official documents shows a “systematic” chain of abuse to inclu= de methods of torture that started in the War on Terror and have transferred o= n to the War in Iraq (Danner, lecture). The questi= ons that continue to rise from the involvement of high level officials may elud= e to past policy level decisions that justified torture while masking it at the = same time. Soldiers must battle wi= th their own conscience as to their involvement.&nb= sp; The proper rules that should act as safeguards may prevent violence from continuing after the veteran re-enters civilian life, however= , it is the unrestrained violence in children’s video games, films, and television that desensitizes and conditions young people to recreate it.

The gradual process of normalizing violence and desensitizing the citizenry to killing = is one which begins from the earliest days a child is introduced to cartoons.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> It becomes a continual progression= as the child makes their way from PG ratings to PG-13 to R. By the time one is ten, a child co= uld have seen thousands of violent images with gradually greater acts of violen= ce. Grossman points out the environment in which violent movies are viewed play a crucial role in normalizing acts of violence with associated rewards in a kind of “Clockwork Orange classical conditioning process” with: candy, soda, cute girlfriend, euphoric mood, and the release from a mundane reality (302). At the same time, rest= raint from viewer-ship among peers creates a negative response from the group. Disgust at violence displays weakn= ess, thus it is in the interest of the individual within the group to not just b= e a viewer, but an excited and active one.&nbs= p; Therefore, violent scenes are often cheered as opposed to awed. It appears, Grossman’s study= is summed up best as he explains the effects of such internalizing: “If = we had a clear-cut objective of raising a generation of assassins and killers = who are unrestrained by either authority or the nature of the victim, it is difficult to imagine how we could do a better job” (310).

If movies = expose the violence, video games take it one step further in placing the controls = of violent actions in the player’s hands. Inside arcades all over America, many video games provide first hand shooting opportunities to kids. Similar to law enforcement training programs, arcade games are formatted so that the player aims and shoots a pistol at a screen with walking and talking individuals who realistically d= ie as you pull the trigger. The difference is that law enforcement personnel are trained to distinguish combatant from noncombatant and can face serious consequences if they fail = the exercise. Children however, d= o not face any consequences except the loss of a quarter. They become conditioned to the art= of killing, but without any of the necessary restraints we place on society= 217;s protectors. Home video games = such as Grand Theft Auto extend the boundaries as far as rewarding the ch= ild for killing civilians and police officers with bonus points and video cash. A child without proper distinctions of right and wrong in the video world may have a difficult time distinguishing the differences in reality.

Long ago, = the Pentagon realized the opportunity available for recruiting young, vulnerabl= e, and desensitized individuals into the armed forces by advertising through <= st1:City w:st=3D"on">Hollywood. David L. Robb has done extensive research into the relationship between the Pentagon and Hollywood and has found that each side = bows to other for mutual payoffs. = Their reciprocal relationship involves the Pentagon providing a public affairs li= aison when Hollywood needs to borrow helicopters, jets, and soldiers for military films. The Pentagon’s only concern = is that the defense and executive branch of government are given a favorable i= mage in the film. Any “problems” with the script are quickly pointed out to the write= rs for repair. Once final recommendations are complete, the Pentagon provides the equipment (which co= uld include access to public land, hundreds of soldiers, or any number of requested materials) and the filming takes place. Before release o= f the film, the public affairs liaison views the film to ensure everything is as = the contract stated and the image of the military remains favorable. Oftentimes military recruiting advertisements will be thrown in prior to the film as a good will gesture f= rom the studio.

The effect= s of this ongoing program have been positive for both sides. After the release of Top Gun in 19= 86, naval recruitment of young men went up 500 percent. Recruiters were setting up booths = inside many theatres as naïve adolescents left the film eager to sign-up for = four years. Army public affairs of= ficer Maj. David Georgi said: “These kids came out of the movie with eyes as big as saucers and said, ‘Where do I sign up?’” (Robb 182= ).

One popula= r film, “The Right Stuff”, was filled with obscene language before the Pentagon got a hold of the script. The public affairs officer, Donald E. Burggrabe asked the writers to “polish” the script since, if it were distributed as an R movie= it would, “cut down on the teenage audience which is a prime one of the military services when our recruiting goals are considered” (Robb 188= ).

The Pentag= on is frank about the role it plays in Hollywood. A 2003 General Accounting Office R= eport to the Senate and House Committee on Armed Services outlines the need to influence potential recruits at a young age and for recruiters to act as a role-model up until the point of entrance into service. Using Hollywood as a catalyst of influence the military effectively gathers potentials at every violent box office hit.

The milita= ry does not stop with Hollywood in its efforts to take advantage of the normalization of violence in our society. One of its greatest recruiting drives is with NASCAR racing.&n= bsp; Once again, the military is completely up-front in these efforts, Admiral Thomas Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard explains: “The Coast Guard entered into the partnership (NASCAR) as a unique opportunity to showcase the Coast Guard and tell our story to an unprecedented audience of potential recruits and those that influence them” (http://www.coas= tguardracing.com/news/2004/091104.htm). It begs the question though, = what do racecars have to do with the Coast Guard?

One must understand the environment of NASCAR to really see what draws the military = to apply a significant amount of its 98 percent increase in advertising since = 1998 (GAO 2003). The exciting outd= oor environment draws families to the big racetracks much as did air shows in t= he past. NASCAR has become a = 220;Red State” sport, bleeding patriotism in between the barrage of advertisements. Marketers of all kinds set up tent= s and booths on the periphery of the racetrack to display their products. The various military services not = only take part in the opening ceremonies that may include a fighter jet fly-over, color guard, and the national anthem, but also race cars of their own. Millions of tax dollars go into fu= nding private citizens / celebrities to drive and work on the vehicles. Members of the race team are civil= ians mixed with military officers who work on media relations and manage operati= ons.

Children b= ecome attached early on to the sport through family and friends, but also by the presence of military personnel decked out in full uniform. The excitement of games and the fr= iendly environment, as well as the occasional high-speed crash all bring a subtle attraction to the military. T= he idea is to make the event as memorable as fishing with one’s father.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The portrayal of the military is a= lways positive like Dad, but reality shows, as one gets older, Dad was not always= perfect.

The conseq= uences of the various media industry relationships with the Pentagon are clear. Violence in our society has become increasingly normalized through incremental changes in what viewers see and= do for their entertainment. The Pentagon has taken advantage of this aperture to increase its recruit levels given the crisis atmosphere of 9/11 has begun to subside and potential applicants have diminished. W= hen the reality of violence hits home, no matter how normalized the citizenry a= re to it, the difference between fiction and reality becomes apparent.

Grossman t= ells us: “Indeed, the history of warfare can be seen as a history of increasin= gly more effective mechanisms for enabling and conditioning men to overcome the= ir innate resistance to killing their fellow human beings” (13). With this same conditioning being applied to civil society, it is likely we will bring the war to our own streets.

Works Cited

- Danner, Mark. “Huma= n Right, International Law, and The War on Terrorism”. Booth

Auditorium= , Boalt Hall. University of California Berkeley. 2 May 2005.

- General Accounting Office= . Report to the Senate and House Committees on Armed

Service= s. “Military Recruiting: DOD Ne= eds to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising’s Effectiveness”. Sept. 2003.

- Grossman, Dave. On Killing. Little Brown &a= mp; Company. 1996: New York.

- IMDB News. Draping the= Flag Over the News. Internet. = Sept. 20, 2001. Available at:

http://www= .imdb.com/news/sb/2001-09-20

- Karras, Alan. PEIS 100 Co= urse Reader. John Stuart Mill. Representative Government.

University of Califo= rnia Berkeley. Spring 2005.

- Orwell, George. 1984. Signet Classics. New York.

- Robb, David L. Operati= on Hollywood. Pro= motheus Books. 2004: New York.

- Team Coast Guard Racing. Press Release. Internet. Sept 11, 2004: Kim Labonte <= /o:p>

Attends Department of Defense Conference at Pacific Military Bases. Trackside Marketing Group, LLC. Available at: http://www.coastguar= dracing.com/news

/2004/0911= 04.htm

- Wilusz, Kathleen. “= The Destruction Will Not be Televised: Media Representations of

Destructio= n in the Persian Gulf War and Sanctions against Iraq”. Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers. No. 87, Spring 2002.

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