Democracy in the Middle East

Is Democracy the Answer for the Middle East?

Russia, Ch= ina, and the United State= s are entering a critical period of economic growth. Each country’s need for impor= t-oriented energy resources will grow by increasing amounts in the decades to come. This has focused their atten= tion on the Middle East, one of the greatest = sources of petroleum on Earth. With emboldened leadership, the United States has sought out a strategic foothold in the Middle Ea= st through the use of military force and diplomatic coercion. The U.S. has emphasized its missi= on as one that will spread the seed of democracy and free markets throughout a re= gion ruled by authoritarian regimes. However idealistic one may envision the outcome, the reality is ever clear: the Middle East does not hold the necessary institutions for the establishment of a liberal democracy.

This essay= will discuss the present and historical problems associated with Middle Eastern,= oil – exporting states, and their failure to develop liberal democratic systems of government. This w= ill be analyzed primarily with the example of authoritarian regimes assuming the r= ole of a “Rentier state” and applying bargaining conditions upon th= eir populations to suppress political mobilization. I will conclude with the role powe= r politics plays as an external force attempting to democratize the Middle East.

The Middle East has suffered from the “resource curse”, which implies that those endowed with large supplies of natur= al resources will suffer from low levels of development. It is assumed poor countries with = rich natural assets suffer from this curse because they take on the role of the = Rentier state. According to Michael R= oss, the concept of the rentier state arose from 20^th century European governments dispersing loans out to non-European states. Hazem Beblawi refined the concept = to suggest that only regime leaders within a state received the wealth accrued from the rent of access to canals, natural resources, or other national ass= ets (Ross 329). In the Middle East, oil has been the primary rent and reve= nue source governments have relied upon.

Middle Eas= tern states using their natural resources as the primary source of revenue have hindered internal economic development, and any form of democratization from below. The Rentier state does= not require its citizens to pay taxes, thus dismissing any implication of: “no taxation without representation”. In fact, the Saudi regime has prac= ticed an extremely generous form of social welfare for its citizens that includes free education, utilities, health care, and guaranteed employment. Through a process of “purcha= sing allegiance”, the Saudi family has effectively cultivated the support = of the masses below (Zahedi). Unfortunately, the emphasis on social welfare has created an enormous bureaucracy that accounts for roughly 90% of economic activity. Suc= h a bureaucracy has come to resemble Soviet-style corruption, a “pervasive obstacle to substantive economic development” (Kamrava 263).

Dependency= upon the state is a significant deterrence toward developing a liberal democracy= in the Middle East. Reliance upon state bureaucracies = weakens what incentives may be gained from competition in the market. As a result, foreign direct invest= ment has been focused only on the state-run resource market. While oil production lacks high la= bor intensity, the jobless rate has increased (up to 25% in Saudi Arabia, a startling figure when related to the fact that 65% of the population is und= er 25) (Zahedi). Dependenc= y upon the state has become self-perpetuating as economies decline and populations increase. In order for regime= s to remain in power, they will insist upon a stronger security apparatus to ens= ure their continued reign. Curren= tly, external threats have been mitigated by the United States (Iraq in Kuwait= , 1991). They hold a strategic and economic= dependence upon Middle Eastern stability. However, internal difficulties may only be solved by the gradual loosening of authoritarian grips upon the democratic process. Instead, the grip has been strengt= hened by violent and coercive tactics, and through the use of bargaining agreemen= ts from above.

Citizens of the Middle East are compelled to accept their governments “ruling bargain”. State elites = cater to the needs of the people, as long as the people remain silent and give the regime their allegiance (Kamrava 332).&nbs= p; Allegiance comes at a price however, as Middle Eastern states have b= uilt harsh and violent security apparatus that are coercive enough to keep the population in awe. Any form of political mobilization that threatens the autonomy of the regime is struck down. By crushing political dissent, regimes push further away from a democratic transition and enhance= the institutional mechanisms of authoritarian rule (Kamrava 332). Civil institutions which seek to g= arner economic and political change are weakened and pushed to the sidelines of d= aily discourse. When these civil institutions are silenced, the only voice left is the state. Because the state provides all of = the incentives, be they economic or political, there is little impulse to depart from the dependency on the state. The harrowing fact is that once the state is unable to provide all it has promised, internal strife will ensue.&= nbsp; Young men will look towards religious or political entrepreneurs for inspiration and guidance once the legitimacy of the state and its “ru= ling bargain” have become bogus. The increasing global demand for Middle East<= /st1:place> oil will certainly serve as an external bargaining tool for which political entrepreneurs can rally the masses toward irrational statism.

China and the United States have growing en= ergy needs that can not be fully met on domestic soil. By 2025, China will need to import approximately 73% of all of its oil, much of which could potentially come from the Middle East (K= lare 166). A China that appears to be increasingly nationalistic over time may have little difficulty compelling its country to invade the Midd= le East for “national security”. It is my belief, that the threat o= f a future clash for energy resources compelled the leaders of the United States to initiate the first-move o= n what Zbigniew Brezinski calls the “grand chessboard” of the Middle East (Klare 151).

By invadin= g Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has = sent a message to the powers in Beijing and Moscow that the US is to be the sole hegemony= in the region. This has raised conce= rns for China and Russia that the U.S. will one day attempt to = enforce political leverage on either power. Just as evinced in Middle Eastern nations, he who holds control of t= he oil spigot, by-default hold’s the bargaining power. For example, China is concerned with free access to sea-lanes in the Strait of Malacca and the= Taiwan Strait (Zweig & Jianhai 33). These lanes could be frozen by any= number of variables that could result from a decision by Taiwan to dissolve from mainland China. In a show of force, China has threatened military invasion, if= Taiwan = chooses such action. In the meantime,= China and = Russia are actively pursuing other markets for energy to include Venezuela and Iran, two powers that openly renounce Washington foreign policy.

Few would = question the United States sinc= erity in democratizing the Middle East. After all, it was the inspiration = of those like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Von Hayek who motivated Western po= wers to reinvigorate free-market ideals at the expense of a welfare state. These ideals are fundamental to U.S. objectives in the Middle East. If the U.S. can establish these principles as the foundation of a new Middle East, the proponents believe they will ensure future access to natural resources and provide an open and stable society. Oil will be sold to the U.S. by market demand, rather than through the regulation of suspicious institut= ions such as OPEC. However, while = the proponents were guided by a noble vision, it was obscured by impressions of imperialism that are emblematic in world history.

The U.S., acting as the overseer of reconstruc= tion in Iraq<= /st1:country-region>, is viewed as an occupying force. Many Middle Easterners find the U.S. suspect, with good reason. Historically, external powers have been seen as threats to be avoided or defeated. Under such uncertainty, citizens o= f the new government are unlikely to trust their new leaders. Couple this mistrust with ethnic, religious, and economic cleavages that serve to reinforce each other, and o= ne finds a treacherous environment tipping towards civil war (Zahedi). Huntington’s thesis inevitably comes back to haunt those idealists who assume democracy = is the answer to every conflict. Iraq, and much of the Middle East, has lived under oppressive dictatorships for many years = that have undermined the elements which serve to build a stable democracy. They have also suffered grave econ= omic conditions in recent years (Iraq suffering over 10 years of economic sanctions) that empowered the regimes a= nd weakened civil institutions. = Those fixtures that thrive are limited to those that serve the state, notably religious institutions which promote intolerance of outside culture and strict obedie= nce to faith.

When the <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">U.S. invaded Iraq, it brought down Sadaam’s coercive apparatus, and the only system that held individuals accountable for their actions. The U.S. fa= iled to quickly replace the authoritarian regime with a civil society embodying an independent middle class that held democratic principles in high esteem, ho= nored the rule of law, and was prepared to operate in the absence of coercive rul= e. Such a change requires many years,= not an overnight transition. Owen Harries explains the difference between the ideals of policy makers and the reality on the ground:

While the United States can provide an example to emulate, democracy is not a commodity that can be exported, or a gift that can be bestowed. To= be viable, political institutions and political cultures require a long, organ= ic, indigenous growth, and to attempt without a sudden dislocation of what exis= ts is more likely to produce unintended consequences than intended ones (83).<= o:p>

Thus, the consequences of o= ur actions include a political economic environment where the greatest labor opportunities for young men are to join the insurgency against occupation.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>

The United States must be prepared to assume t= he risks of an illiberal democracy established in Iraq. An illiberal democracy may help to centralize power and stabilize the region for the prospects of economic growth. It also may usher in a theocratic regime that will rally its citizens against U.S. foreign policy. But only after the economy is give= n the proper means to liberalize, an independent middle class firmly established,= and education secularized will the foundations for a liberal democracy be established. A constitution a= nd a vote will not be enough to ensure stability.

Works Cited=

Harries, Owen. “The Perils of Hegemony” The Right War? The Conservative D= ebate on Iraq. Ed. Gary Rosen. Cambridge Universit= y Press 2005.

Kamrava, Mehran. The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since The Fi= rst World

War, 2005, Chapters 8, 10.

Klare, Michael T.&nbs= p; Blood and Oil, 2004, Ch. 6

Ross, Michael L. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, April 2001, pp. 325-61.

Zahedi, Dariush. Class Lectures. PEIS 101, Fall 2005.

Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy”. Foreign Affairs,

Sept/Oct. 2005, pp. 25-38.<= /p>