Engineering of Nationalism

The Engineering of Nationality Under Perestroika

Matthew Dearing

Associate Professor Edward W. Walker

Political Science 149a:

Nationalism, Religion, and Identity Po= litics in the Soviet Union and S= uccessor States

5 November 2005

Outline

This essay= will analyze the period of change prior to and during Perestroika that influenced leaders to demand self-determination. I will argue that national grievances were not historically suppress= ed throughout the union republics of the Soviet Union, rather they were a manifestation of events surrounding Perestroika, and in particular, used by political and cultural elites to construct a national m= yth that would subvert the dying Soviet ideology. The course of this argument w= ill be three-fold. I will begin by explaining Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented tradition”= and the role of instrumental nationalism in support of political manipulators.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> I will then describe the failures = of Perestroika in upholding Soviet ideology and control within the union repub= lics. Lastly, I will describe how politi= cal and cultural elites within the union republics (particularly the Baltic Sta= tes) capitalized on the mistakes of perestroika to mobilize their people toward self-determination and secession from the Union.

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The Engineering of Nationality under Perestroika

The power = of Soviet ideology over the people of the USSR was paralyzing. Even those wi= th relatively new national identities fell victim to its coercion. It would take many years of modern= ization and competition with the west, coupled with the economic flaws of a central= ly planned economy, to press the fragile Soviet system to institute a set of reforms known as Perestroika. This paradigm shift sparked a period of liberalization contrary to the fundamentals of So= viet ideology. Perestroika gave un= ion republics the opportunity to petition for answers to constitutional issues = of self determination and demonstrated the diminished capability of the Soviet Union to govern. The environment would prove crucia= l in establishing a group of local and regional intelligentsia not seen since the October Revolution of 1918. Thus, the divergence from Soviet ideology would not be an awakening of national griev= ances, rather an elite manipulation of conditions to create a new historical narrative.

Eric Hobsb= awm writes critically as one who sees the controlling processes involved with notions such as patriotism, historical narratives, ethnic identities, and t= he perpetuation of the nation-state. These &#= 8220;invented traditions” are used by instrumental actors building constructive hegemonies over societies. Two particular actors of interest are cultural and political leaders who use national symbols, histories, and myths as: “exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative”.= = [1]   Cultural elites create a sto= ry that celebrates the state over the nation and political family through symb= ols such as flags, anthems, folklore, heroic narratives of victory or defeat, a= nd anything else which creates a sense of national pride and consciousness. Political elites are actors who use cultural material to mobilize people and create a manipulative wave of nati= onal struggle. Elites select mater= ial which will aid in the construction of the myth and move the group in the desired direction. In the pro= cess, they may use new material, or move material around in a fashion which provi= des a convincing tale of struggle and arouses the passion in individuals behind= an ethnic or civic ideology.[2] The process, while commonly object= ive, can take on a subjective role amongst people of common identities seeking to fit in with society’s standards.&nbs= p; These new identities can take on a religious appearance and feeling.= According to Stuart Kaufman:

“For the nationalist, the nation is a god – a jealous god – to whom one = pays homage, venerating its temples (monuments), relics (battle flags), and theo= logy (including a mythical history); and receiving in return a sort of immortali= ty as a participant in what is conceived as an eternal nation”.= = [3]

The political elites theref= ore assume the role of religious leader, providing leadership and a love / fear relationship to their flock of willing disciples. While the cause may appear noble i= n the eyes of those who view it as a long historical climax (i.e. intellectuals or true believers), the elite realizes the instrumental opening and takes advantage of it.

            It is this type of cultural and political atmosphere that helped elites consol= idate power over their people and enable the demise of a Soviet paradigm for a nationalist one. However, the elites were emboldened by an already weakened Soviet ideology brought forth= by perestroika. Examining perestroika will al= low us to see how one dominating ideology could be replaced by another.

            The purpose behind perestroika was noble - reform and liberalize the union under Soviet socialism – but it would be the release of the past (Glasnost) that would prevent that ideal from ever materializing. Past atrocities carried out under Stalinism, when publicly realized, would unleash a torrent of protests agai= nst Soviet federalism. The wounds= of the past would further be aggravated by economic disparities, national grievances, and the critical question of secession. A union struggle would then become= one of individual state struggles in which union republics saw their problems originating from Moscow.

            The process of democratization, introduced through perestroika, provided just t= he right opportunity for the Baltic republics to mobilize, “making natio= nalist intentions more meaningful”.[4] It gave credence and power to the = idea of sovereignty, a word tossed around since Lenin, but never realized. Even Communist party members agreed= with the notion of sovereignty, as specified under Leninist terms, providing a w= ay for a titular to be free and remain part of the federation. But while constitutional provisions prevented the application of the act, “the deep ambiguity of the term helped make “sovereignty” an extremely effective rallying slogan for the nationalist movements in the Baltic republics”.= = [5]   Much to Gorbachev’s surprise, the term would become the tipping point toward further breakdown = of the federation. When Estonia claimed its sovereignty in November 1988, it would take only 2 years for the “parade of sovereigntiesR= 21; to complete their message, all but the most “primordial” of the republics, Armenia, would claim sovereignty.[*] Once sovereignty was realized, rep= ublics began instituting new laws and regulations that violated Soviet laws –= ; in effect, making the Union increasingly ir= relevant.= = [6]

What caught Gorbachev and Soviet leadership off guard was not the excitement of liberalization within the union republics, rather the way in which it was interpreted. Instead of refor= ms that would stimulate the flowering and drawing together of nations, liberalization was identified as a means of breaking away from the threat o= f Russification, economic problems, = and growing departmentalism. It a= lso became the answer to the critical question of national self-determination t= hat Soviet ideology could never bear to address. It would be under the conditions o= f a weakened Soviet structure that a new class of intellectuals would rise and create a = new national identity in the Baltic republics.

Many facto= rs contributed to the ability of cultural and political elites to mobilize the Baltic republics into seeking sovereign statehood. First was the relative recent memo= ry of their independence from 1918 – 1940.= When glasnost made public the truth behind the annexation of the Bal= tic republics in the 1939 Molentov R= 11; Ribbentrop Pact, political elites used this as a mobilizing tool, instilling a memory of when they were free and removed from Soviet dominati= on, and placing blame on Soviets for throwing their nationalist aspirations off course. Their close proximity= to western affluence added to the feeling of loss, where it was only across the sea, i= n Finland= , that economic prosperity lied.

The manner= in which cultural elites morphed history and myth helped fuel anger and fear a= mongst a listening public. Gail Lapi= dus describes how the experiences of Stalinism were conveyed to people as not simply brutish and violent, but as a means of oppression, “as a deliberate effort to annihilate specific nations and national cultures̶= 1;.= = [7] Fear helped spread elite manifesta= tion of Soviet oppression through the perpetuation of myths by word of mouth, or through the rise of media coverage that questioned past and present ideologies.

Fears were= not limited to violence. Cultural elites routinely questioned the push to make Russian the federal language a= nd how it threatened historical roots of national identities. Viewed as Russifying their unique identities, the language issue became a broader one that saw the “elder brother” (Russians) as “p= atronizing” and “insulting”.[8] This led elites to further extend = the use of their own languages within their titular republics.

Local elit= es viewed departmentalism as a serious detriment to local interests. Central planners could easily take= from small communities on the periphery in order to supply the center, without c= ompensation, and doing so with disregard for environmental consequences. Lapidus concludes that the center “treated territory as if it were a factory floor rather than a nation’s home”, empowering elites in the Baltics to proclaim the only way toward economic efficiency would be through liberating their local economies, and providing environmental sovereignty over nuclear energy, min= ing, and hazardous materials.[9] The tactical use of tying environm= ental and economic demands to political demands helped tighten the control of resources into the hands of local powers.

Elites gra= bbed hold of the argument for national self-determination and made secession a c= lear answer to the problems faced within the Union. The dissemination would come by wa= y of increased parading of national hymns, flags, and pageantry all which expres= sed emotional commitments to the cause of national revival. What were once only “imagined communities” were now expressed as national resurrections by the crypt keepers themselves – elites. <= /span>

Ronald Suny describes how local elites fought to grab hold of power in the midst of a crippling Soviet system:

In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, the old elites dressed up in nationalist garb to preserve their dominion and suppress democratic movements. In other republics, where democracy did remove Communists, the deep infrastruc= ture of clan politics remained in place.[10]

A movement for all people, = behind the scenes, was one for the masquerading few.

            Suny describes the act of secession put in place by Lenin, as a, “time bom= b”. Perestroika was the catalyst that = set off that time bomb, and put the wheels in motion for the downfall of the Soviet Union. Expecting the elites to act any different than to manipulate the environment for their advantage may be counterintuitive given the contagion= of stagnation in the Soviet Union. The policies of Glasnost and Peres= troika brought hope to many that long-standing issues and grievances would finally= be addressed. But it would be the issue of self-determination that elites could easily rally their citizens behind. National republics he= ld without sovereignty in the rhetoric of perestroika simply did not mix for citizens of union republics, nor the leaders. As Suny explains:

“Once it bec= ame possible to break the imperial tie (…) nationalist leaders moved to t= ake control of the destinies of their own peoples”.

In doing so they rewrote th= e narrative of their past and committed to telling a new story for the future - one of = hope and prosperity, forever absent of Soviet oppression.



Works Cited